Introduction
This news report on a First World War Zeppelin raid in England uses citizen testimony to communicate the drama of the event. It is one of the first accounts of a new type of warfare, air raids, that extended the zone of killing beyond the frontline and into, what has henceforth come to be known as, the home front: 'Those whom air raids affected ', as Grayzel (2012) argues, "had to confront an essential feature of modern and total warfare: every home could come under fire. As a result, civilians mattered in wartime as never before" (p. 2). It is this elevated status of the civilian in total warfare that has since rendered citizen voice a crucial part of war and conflict reporting (Goode 2009 ). For, by speaking from the perspective of war victims, citizen voice enhances the authenticity of journalism, whilst by exposing their stories of suffering, it introduces moral argument into war reporting and takes side in the conflict.
Even though citizen authenticity and moral argument today remain cornerstones of digital journalism (Allan 2013) , there are differences in the use of citizen voice then and now. In 20 th century reporting, as shown, citizen voice is subordinate to the voice of the journalist who authors the report; it also expresses personal experience instead of conveying newsworthy information; and it is linguistic rather than visual. Moreover, as the last sentence of the quote suggests, citizen voice is used to reflect popular sentiment around people's suffering and, in so doing, aims to unify readers around the imagined community of the nation.
Contemporary war reporting is different. As we shall see, it relies on digital platforms, where citizen voice, in the form of tweets or emails, appears alongside that of the journalist; treats this voice as a source of information rather than only experience or emotion; and consists of visual testimony, in mobile phone snapshots or videos, as well as linguistic account (Chouliaraki, 2010) . Finally, given that conflicts today occur mostly outside the West, citizen voice is not used to rally people around the nation but to offer multiple perspectives on the conflict, calling into being a trans-national, rather than national, imagined community (Kampf & Liebes, 2013) .
The new visibility of citizen voice in digital journalism has been hailed as a turning point in the power relations of news production, in that it empowers a hitherto "passive" audience:
"the news," as Russell (2011) argues, "moves from being mostly journalist-centered, communicated as a monologue, and primarily local, to also being increasingly audiencecentered," enabling people to "deeply affect the news, in which the margins grow in power to shape the center" (p. 1238). In the post-Arab Spring conflicts, such as Libya and Syria, for instance, where the exclusion or persecution of professional journalists were pervasive (Salama 2013) , citizen journalism became a necessary dimension of Western conflict reporting, so that, as Wollenberg and Pack (2013) argue, "even the NATO decision to intervene on humanitarian grounds (in Libya, LC) was influenced by this powerful new mechanism made up of the alliance of social media and pan-Arab channels" (p. 197) . The potential of citizen voice "deeply affect the news" stems, here, from its capacity to witness conflict from the perspective of civilians and, thereby, raise the moral demand of the responsibility to protect these civilians.
Questions, however, arise. To what extent is citizen voice incorporated in Western news platforms and how is it articulated with journalistic witnessing? Is witnessing the only contribution of citizen voice in war and conflict reporting? And how does citizen witnessing portray war suffering and propose forms of responsibility and action towards the suffering?
It is these questions I explore in this article. I begin by providing the theoretical context in which citizen voice can today be understood as a constitutive dimension of war and conflict reporting and then proceed to provide a novel conceptualisation of citizen voice as a practice of "securitisation" of the news -a digital discursive practice that thematises the suffering and death of conflict as a cause for concern and possibly action. I subsequently employ this conceptualisation in a comparative analysis of convergent news on two post-Arab Spring conflicts, Libya and Syria, to show how differences in their incorporation of citizen voice produce variations in the securitisation of news across contexts. These variations, I conclude, bear implications on the discourses of responsibility and action that each piece of news articulates, throwing into relief the hierarchies of place and human life that, pace the celebratory rhetoric on citizen voice, continue to dominate global news.
Civilian testimony in convergent journalism
Two factors have contributed to the rise of civilian testimony in war and conflict reporting.
The first is the new accessibility of digital media, which has indeed enabled ordinary people to take unprecedented control over the recording and dissemination of information, rendering conflict reporting "much more complex and varied than in the past" (Kampf & Liebes, 2013, p. 3) . The second is changes in warfare itself. Unlike the First World War, and subsequent conflicts of the 20 th century, with their clear-cut distinction between war zone and home front, contemporary warfare, waged largely through suicide bombings, city skirmishes and drone attacks, has moved into urban spaces and placed civilians at the heart of conflict. As a result, "the proportion of all war casualties that are civilian has increased from about 14% in the First World War to 67% the Second World War, and to 90% in the 1990s" (Spiegel & Salama, 2000 , p. 2204 . At the same time, civilians have become instrumental in the conduct of, so called, "humanitarian wars"-wars of the West that are waged in the name of protecting civilians from the violence and threats of non-Western regimes (Bellamy, 2009 ). Citizen voice operates, in this context, as a powerful means of introducing moral argument in the news, insofar as it communicates the people's authentic experience of their suffering as a call for action (Chouliaraki, 2006) . This claim to authenticity has prompted major news institutions to appropriate citizen voice in their own renewed vision of journalism as a collaborative project. At the BBC, for instance, the lesson drawn from disaster and terror reporting, such as the tsunami (2004) and the London attacks (2005), is that "when major events occur, the public can offer us as much new information as we are able to broadcast to them. From now on, news coverage is a partnership" (Sambrook, 2009) . It is, in turn, this "partnership" between people's voice and mainstream digital platforms that Deuze (2004) defines as convergent journalism -the online presentation of a "news story package" that incorporates more than one media format, including "the spoken and written word, music, moving and still image, graphic animations, including interactive and hypertextual elements" (p. 140). Driven by technocommercial and professional interests, the rise of convergent journalism is nonetheless primarily invested in an ethico-political discourse, that of "giving voice" to the public (Russell, 2011) . For it is these convergent platforms, of the BBC, CNN or Al Jazeera, that ultimately mediate citizen voice into mainstream broadcasting and thus enable this voice to become global, to participate, that is, in the "global network structure and enter the battle over the minds by intervening in the global communication process" (Castells, 2007, p. 244 ).
Yet, whilst everyone agrees that citizen voice is today a constitutive aspect of convergent war and conflict reporting, there is disagreement as to its political and moral implications: to what extent does citizen voice contribute to mobilising a sense of responsibility and, potentially, action towards war victims? and how, if at all, can it challenge the geo-political relations of power, as they are reflected in Western conflict reporting? Two positions dominate this debate, the optimistic and the pessimistic one.
The optimistic position celebrates citizen voice for offering a new visibility of suffering in the news (Allan, 2013) . Citizen voice, the argument has it, breaks with the dominant pattern of war and conflict reporting, the state-driven propaganda in the name of national interest (Herman & Chomsky 1988) , by communicating the civilian experience of war. Such communication relies on testimonies of the ordinary eye-witness, who produces heartrending narratives, "designed," in Cottle's (2013) words, "to humanize, sense-ize and bring home the plight of distant others" (p. 13). For instance, the reporting of the post-Arab Spring conflicts on Twitter and Facebook worked as a "partisan advocate" (Wollenberg & Pack, 2013) , bypassing state propaganda and placing civilian suffering in Libya and Syria into the global spotlight: "what national and international audiences see," as Kampf and Liebes (2013) claim, "are pictures of the suffering of innocent people …which means that viewers spontaneous demand is to stop the suffering straight away" (p. 9).
The pessimistic view, however, regards this "spontaneous demand" with suspicion, challenging the altruistic potential of civilian testimony. Instead, it links citizen testimony with the expansion of corporate media and their need to re-legitimize journalism in the face of a declining consumption of news (Scott, 2005) . The rise of citizen voice constitutes, in this context, a "demotic," rather than a "democratic," turn in that, by trading professional validity for personal authenticity, prioritises the immediacy of experience over fact-checking and expert analysis (Turner, 2010) . As Kampf and Liebes (2013) show in their analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, citizen voice today replaces the voice of authority (generals or politicians), thereby personalising the content of war and conflict reporting: "new actors occupy centre-stage and tell of their own personal experiences in melodramatic and heartrending language" (p. 12). The consequence is that journalism provides the resources for judgment necessary to understand the war: "armed conflict," they conclude, "is increasingly covered in ways that stress the micro-level individual experience rather than the macro-issues of the collective social good" (p. 12). Simultaneously, whilst claiming to introduce a new pluralism of voice, convergent journalism recreates the traditional hierarchy of journalism by carefully distinguishing professional contributions from amateur Suspended between these positions, celebrating the moralising potential of convergent journalism or regretting the demise of the news into a 'journalism of emotion', the argument on citizen voice remains unresolved. Consequently, it also fails to address the key empirical question of how the reporting of different conflicts may vary, depending on how such voice is remediated in Western platforms. Following Robinson's (2011) claim that "research into the impact of media and communication processes needs to be done with due attention to the multiplicity of non-media processes that shape political actions and outcomes," (p. 6) I therefore propose that we approach the role of citizen voice in the convergent news on postArab Spring conflicts as primarily a political process, which depends not only on the use of digital media on-the-ground but also on the geo-political and military interests of the West.
Let me, then, next present a conceptual framework for the analysis of citizen voice in Western convergent news on Libya and Syria in terms of the political process of securitisation.
The convergent journalism of conflict as securitisation
Citizen voice as a politics of pity: The reporting of humanitarian war entails a new news structure that relies on the representation of suffering as a cause of responsibility, and potentially action, for Western publics. This thematisation of suffering in war journalism enacts, what we may call, a politics of pity: a politics of representing conflict that, in order to gain public legitimacy, construes the conflict as a scene of action between sufferers, their persecutors and their saviours (Chouliaraki, 2006) . In centring upon the human toll of conflict, pity foregrounds questions of death, victimhood, injury and displacement whilst it backgrounds questions of interest, alliance, rivalry and power, which, nonetheless, continue to dominate the sphere of global governance -for the very conception of states as deserving security (or not) already presupposes a specific relationship of power between those who offer and those who need protection or, in Duffield's (2007) This discursive work of pity in construing a conflict as humanitarian emergency can be defined as a "securitisation" of news -a process "aimed at convincing a target audience to accept, based on what it knows about the world, the claim that a specific development is threatening enough to deserve an immediate policy to alleviate it" (Balzacq, 2005, p. 173 ).
The news becomes, then, a site of securitisation, insofar as the proposal to act in the name of civilian security depends upon the systematic use of discursive resources of the news to invest the conflict in moral meaning and engage its publics with the demand for action.
Rather than assuming, therefore, that journalism simply reports on pre-existing events, the politics of pity suggests that journalism bears a performative force upon these events, construing them from particular standpoints, at the moment that it claims to simply represent them (Chouliaraki, 2013) . By this token, journalism also bears a performative effect on the publics it addresses, insofar as these publics are mundanely invited to engage with the news' politics of pity and relate to its discourses of responsibility towards civilian suffering -thereby establishing "the media (as) a key player in terms of the creation, propagation and dissemination of the discourses which shape the world around us" (Robinson 2001, p. 5) . In focusing on Western journalism, therefore, my question becomes how BBC news securitises Libya and Syria as humanitarian conflicts and, in so doing, which forms of responsibility it proposes to the publics it addresses.
Witnessing and Deliberation: My starting point in addressing this question is that the securitisation of the news relies upon the act of witnessing -upon reporting on the experience of those present in the scene of conflict. For it is the testimonies of conflict as a scene of suffering that, in turn, makes it possible for Western publics to bear witness to the conflict and engage with it in morally acceptable and politically legitimate ways ii . Its power to move and moralise granted, however, witnessing can only legitimise action once it is further authorised by international stakeholders that not only deem suffering civilians as worth acting upon but also judge the conditions of the suffering to be possible and desirable to act upon. This is because the question of security is not a fixed moral "truth" but, as Hansen (2006) argues, it is always entangled with the power relations of the international order and, therefore, becomes an object of deliberation among interested parties, as they negotiate humanitarian versus other, more self-interested forms of responsibility. The securitisation of news, it follows, depends as much on testimonials of suffering as on authoritative voices that assign particular discourses of responsibility to the stakes of a conflict, be these the voices of the UN, INGOS or national governments (Watson 2011) 
Conflict reporting in Libya and Syria
The BBC's convergent reporting on Libya and Syria offers daily live updates of the conflicts, by using a multi-platform online structure: twitter and email messages, "eye-witness" links with footage and "have your say" links with people's testimonials and opinions. This hybrid structure de-homogenises the news story, as sources, appear in a temporal (what-comesfirst), rather than narrative, sequence, that invites multiple modes of user engagement:
reading, clicking and navigating, skimming through images (Chouliaraki, 2010) . How does each piece of news on Libya and Syria manage this hybridity so as to activate a particular politics of pity around each conflict?
Libya
The Libyan story is denser than the Syrian one, reflecting an easier flow of information onthe-ground. It, consequently, offered more frequent updates, which, however, remain radically open-ended, as events are randomly reported rather than ordered in a hierarchy of significance.
Witnessing: There are 113 instances of eye-witnessing in the 148 update entries of the Libyan online broadcast. These can be categorised in two classes, civilian and professional eye- Out of the 113 entries of eye-witnessing, the majority (54) are indirect professional testimonies, journalistic reports on civilian experiences, followed by direct testimonies of journalists (51) and by the ordinary witnessing of civilian tweets (6). The BBC, thus, reverses the Al Jazeera practice of conflict reporting as civilian witnessing (Wollenberg & Pack, 2013) to prioritise instead the professionalization of citizen testimonies through indirect witnessing -journalists reporting on civilian accounts. Whilst this emphasis reflects the large number of journalists on mission in Libya, it simultaneously resonates with the epistemological shift in online news reporting from a conception of truth as journalistic objectivity towards a multi-vocal conception of truth that relies on personal experience, remediated and validated as this is by professionals (Allan, 2013) .
Through this shift towards multi-vocal news, the BBC online footage of Libya managed to articulate a powerful politics of pity, which consistently used the figures of victim, perpetrator and benefactor to propose a discourse of responsibility as the protection of Libyan civilians. This is the case in civilian testimonies, for instance: 09.44 Libyan Youth
Movement tweets "Tanks were used this morning and fired at residential buildings on the city of
Zawia but yet again Gaddafi fails to control #Libya #Feb17," which uses the distinction between people and army to establish the two sides of the conflict in terms of an unequal and immoral battle -Gaddafi's "tanks" "fire" at "residential buildings"-and, simultaneously to In summary, the BBC's online journalism on Libya combines a discourse of denunciation, in its witnessing claims, with appeals to humanitarian intervention, in its deliberation claims.
The securitisation of BBC's convergent news, lies, then, in its capacity to both narrate the Libya conflict from the perspective of civilians under threat and to invest this perspective with moral argument as to why it is important to act on their suffering. In this manner, it effectively promotes the responsibility to protect discourse and contributes to legitimising an international military operation, in the name of saving civilian lives.
Syria
The Syria news also combines professional with citizen voice, but consists of fewer updates than the Libya one and eventually activates a different politics of pity and a distinct process of securitising this conflict.
Witnessing: As with Libya, the Syria news is also made up of instances of civilian and professional eye-witnessing (78 entries in total). The latter, however, rather than being direct journalistic testimonies, consist principally of indirect witnessing (36), because of the absence of Western professionals who were banned by the Syrian government. This difficulty in reporting on the ground is a major difference between two pieces of news, reflected throughout the online broadcast -for instance, 13. civilians as the victim and state army as the persecutor. This familiar contrast is established through the juxtaposition of, on the one hand, a vocabulary of violence ("persistant (sic), random shelling from tanks," "dozens of martyrs," "massacres," "70 lives claimed") and, on the other, a vocabulary of civil protest ("demonstrations were totally peaceful," "protesters were carrying roses"). This politics of pity articulates a discourse of denunciation that, like the Libya news, vilifies the state and victimises the citizens -with the contrast between state propaganda, in "denying the attack" or speaking of civilian "vandalism," and defiant resistance, in "protesters were carrying roses," further consolidating the moral superiority of the latter over the former.
Indirect professional witnessing partly echoes this discourse, in a small number of entries and victim but between two distinct claims about who occupies these positions: for Damascus, the persecutor is "armed gangs," whilst the victim, "security forces," is also the benefactor, called to "restore peace and quiet;" for "dissenting accounts," it is the reverse in that the evil doer is the "loyal troops" massacring "peaceful civilians" -the sufferer. The figures of pity, as established in civilian witnessing, are here reconfigured in ways that shift denunciation into undecidability -the impartial presentation of views held by all parties involved.
In summary, witnessing in the Syrian news differs from witnessing in the Libyan one in that civilian witnessing only partially sustains a discourse of denunciation, whilst professional witnessing introduces a pluralism of testimonials that marginalises denunciation in favour of impartiality.
Deliberating: Similarly to the Libya news, this piece also consists of popular and official deliberation entries (27). Popular deliberation (9) greatest concerns is that the unrest will destabilise Kurdish areas of Syria…" In both cases, the politics of pity has given way to a more complex representation of the conflict, with humanitarian urgency being qualified by political divisions between Western and emerging powers ("a split within the UN Security Council...") or by geo-political considerations ("could further inflame tensions in an already volatile region;" "Turkey has a 900-km border with Syria … the unrest will destabilise Kurdish areas of Syria"). Despite, therefore, the discourse of denunciation, evident in the casting of Syria as an evil persecutor, professional deliberation in this news fails to articulate a politics of pity that would activate indignation against the perpetrator/state and empathy for suffering civilians. Instead, it construes a morally unstable discursive landscape, where a conception of responsibility as realpolitik ultimately prioritises the geo-political concerns of international stakeholders.
The Syria news in BBC's convergent journalism is similar to Libya's in combining a discourse of denunciation, established through its witnessing claims, with humanitarian concerns for civilians, articulated through its deliberation claims. Where the two differ, however, is in that, in Syria, both witnessing and deliberation rely on a more complex representation of the conflict. Whilst witnessing is now characterised by pluralistic testimonials, simultaneously denouncing and justifying civilian deaths, deliberation is split between appeals for action and concerns about the interests of international stakeholders. As a consequence, the securitisation of BBC's Syria news marginalises the discourse of responsibility to protect and stands reluctant towards the option of intervention in the name of human security.
From pity to geo-politics
The prominence of citizen voice in contemporary war and conflict reporting has been both hailed as a democratic turn that gives visibility and control to hitherto powerless audiences and deplored as a demotic turn that sensationalises the news and marginalises deeper understandings of conflict. Rather than taking sides in this debate, I privileged an analytical approach that conceptualises war and conflict reporting as a securitisation of news -a discursive practice by which citizen voice is used to construe conflict as a humanitarian emergency, in line with contemporary conceptions of Western warfare. I subsequently looked into BBC's convergent reporting on two post-Arab Spring conflicts, Libya and Syria, so as to see precisely how citizen voice participates in securitising the news and which moral discourses of intervention it articulates.
In both cases, I showed, the securitisation of conflict news involves a multi-vocal communicative structure, where witnessing, in civilian and professional testimonies, and deliberation, in popular and elite appeals, construe the conflict through specific politics of pity -that is through different configurations of the relationship between sufferers, persecutors and benefactors. Central to this communicative structure are digital media, particularly Twitter, which, unlike traditional media, perform, rather than simply report on, this pluralism of perspectives. In so doing, not only do they act as sources of information but become themselves a site of struggle over the various voices that compete for audibility on the ground. In this struggle, it is the journalistic voice that ultimately dominates convergent platforms, as professional witnessing is an overwhelming majority in Libya (53 direct, 51 indirect vis a vis 6 civilian) and a clear majority in Syria, whereas indirect professional witnessing (36) is more than double to civilian (13); deliberative claims are similarly biased towards elite sources in both contexts with double the number compared to popular ones in both Libya (20 to 10) and Syria (18 to 9). Confirming, thus, Palmer's claim that online news reproduces the power relations of traditional journalism (2013), the hierarchy of voice in these news samples similarly suggests that BBC's convergent journalism privileges professional authority and expertise over ordinary testimony and opinion.
This dominance of professional authority, inevitably, has important implications on the politics of pity in each piece of news: a politics of denunciation in Libya and undecidability in Syria. Even though both pieces share a discourse of denunciation among both their professional and ordinary witnessing accounts, the Libya news reinforces this discourse with popular and elite appeals for support from the international community, whilst the Syria news qualifies the denunciation in two ways: through civilian testimonials that blur the divide between perpetrator and victim and through popular deliberation that holds equally split views on the possibility of Western intervention. As a consequence of their distinct politics of pity, the securitisation of these two pieces of news also differs. Whilst the Libya news unequivocally articulates the responsibility to protect civilians, acting as an exemplary case of the humanitarian ethos of contemporary wars, the Syria one subordinates this to a responsibility towards national and multi-lateral interests vii . Such significant variation in the morality of intervention between the two cases demonstrates that the role of citizen voice in contemporary conflict reporting cannot be decided once and for all. It must be evaluated empirically, on a case-by-case basis. This is because, the capacity of citizen voice to make a difference ultimately depends neither on the networked voluntarism of global activists nor on the professional ethos of humanitarian reporting among journalists. Rather, the capacity of citizen voice to make a difference depends upon the geo-political interests and alliances that global news institutions sustain.
The remediation of citizen voice in digital news, in other words, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a conflict to be construed within a discourse of humanitarian responsibility: 'humanitarian norms ', as Finnemore (1996) argues, 'create only permissive conditions for intervention. They create an "interest" in intervention where none existed. They do not eliminate other competing interests, such as political or strategic interests' p. 157). Unless these 'permissive conditions' are in place, the voice of some suffering civilians will ultimately never manage to make a difference. For, despite the celebrated inclusion of citizen voice in digital platforms, hierarchies of place and human life continue to define who has the right to be heard in these platforms, thereby continuing to classify the world between those who deserve and those who do not deserve protection.
